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Abstract
Recent results in theML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the
optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation
by the follower. Such a learning algorithm operates by querying the best responses or the payoffs
of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by responding as if his payoffs were
much different than what they actually are. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main
challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm
compute a commitment so that best responding to it maximizes the follower’s utility, according to
his true payoffs. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature only focused
on the simplified scenario in which the payoff space is finite, thus leaving the general version of
the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill in this gap, by showing that it is always possible for
the follower to compute (near-)optimal payoffs for various scenarios about the learning interaction
between leader and follower.
1 Introduction
Stackelberg games are a simple yet powerful model for sequential interaction among strategic agents.
In such games there are two players: a leader and a follower. e leader commits to an action, and the
follower acts upon observing the leader’s commitment. e simple sequential structure of the game
permits modeling a multitude of important scenarios. Indicative applications include the competition
between a large and a small firm [Von Stackelberg, 2010], the allocation of defensive resources [Tambe,
2011], the competition among mining pools in the Bitcoin network [Marmolejo-Cossı´o et al., 2019,
Sun et al., 2020], and the protection againmanipulation in elections [Elkind et al., 2019, Yin et al., 2018].
In Stackelberg games, the leader is interested in finding the best commitment she can make, as-
suming that the follower behaves rationally. e combination of such a commitment by the leader and
the follower’s rational best response to it leads to a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE). In general,
the utility that the leader obtains in an SSE is larger than what she would obtain in a Nash equilib-
rium of the corresponding one-shot game [Stengel and Zamir, 2004], implying that the leader prefers
to commit than to engage in a simultaneous game with the follower.
In case the leader has access to both hers and the follower’s payoff parameters, computing an SSE
is a computationally tractable problem [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006]. In practice however, the leader
∗Georgios Birmpas is supported by the ERC Starting grant number 639945 (ACCORD). Jiarui Gan is supported by the
EPSRC International Doctoral Scholars Grant EP/N509711/1. Alexandros Hollender is supported by an EPSRC doctoral stu-
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may have limited or no information about the follower’s payoffs. Consequently, in order to determine
the optimal commitment, the leader must endeavor to elicit information about the incentives of the fol-
lower through indirect means. is avenue of research has led to a plethora of active-learning-based
approaches for the computation of SSEs [Balcan et al., 2015, Blum et al., 2014, Letchford et al., 2009,
Peng et al., 2019, Roth et al., 2016]. At the same time, inspired by recent developments in the ML com-
munity regarding adversarial examples in classification algorithms [Barreno et al., 2010, Lowd and Meek,
2005], there has been a stream of recent papers exploring the notion of adversarial deception by the
follower, when facing algorithms used by the leader for learning SSEs in Stackelberg games.
Specifically, when an algorithm learns an SSE by querying the follower’s best responses, the fol-
lower can use fake best responses to distort the SSE learned by the algorithm. As recently explored
by Gan et al. [2019b], one particular approach the follower can employ, is to imitate best responses
implied by payoffs that are different from his actual ones. erefore, the key to the success of such a
deceptive behavior is to pinpoint the fake payoffs that could make the leader learn an SSE in which the
actual utility of the follower is maximized. In the scenario studied in [Gan et al., 2019b], this task is
trivial as the follower’s choices are limited to a finite set of polynomially many payoff matrices; thus,
to efficiently find out the optimal payoffs, the follower can simply enumerate all possible matrices.
To the best of our knowledge, the general version of this problem, where the follower is allowed
to use any payoff matrix, without restrictions on the space of possible values, has been considered
only in two very recent papers [Gan et al., 2019a, Nguyen and Xu, 2019], which however focused on
the specific application of Stackelberg games to security resource allocation problems. Besides that,
no progress has been made for general Stackelberg games. In this paper, we aim to fill in this gap,
by completely resolving this computational problem, a result that reflects the insecurity of learning to
commit in Stackelberg games.
Our Contribution
We explore how a follower can optimally deceive a learning leader in Stackelberg games by misre-
porting his payoff matrix, and study the tractability of the corresponding optimization problem. As in
previous work, our objective is to compute the fake payoff matrix according to which the follower can
best respond to make the leader learn an SSE in which the true utility of the follower is maximized.
However, unlike the related literature, we do not impose any restrictions on the space from which the
payoffs are selected or on the type of the game. By exploiting an intuitive characterization of all strat-
egy profiles that can be induced as SSEs in Stackelberg games, we show that it is always possible for
the follower to compute a payoff matrix implying an SSE which maximizes his true utility, in polyno-
mial time. Furthermore, we strengthen this result to resolve possible equilibrium selection issues, by
showing that the follower can construct a payoff matrix that induces a unique SSE, in which his utility
is maximized up to some arbitrarily small loss.
Other Related Work
Our paper is related to an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and algo-
rithmic game theory, dealing with scenarios where the samples used for training learning algorithms
are controlled by strategic agents, who aim to optimize their personal benefit. Indicatively, there has
been recent interest in the analysis of the effect of strategic behavior on the efficiency of existing
algorithms, as well as the design of algorithms resilient to strategic manipulation for linear regres-
sion [Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz, 2019, Chen et al., 2018, Dekel et al., 2010, Hossain and Shah, 2020,
Perote and Perote-Pen˜a, 2004, Waggoner et al., 2015] and classification [Chen et al., 2019, Dong et al.,
2018, Meir et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 2019].
Beyond the strategic considerations above, our work is also related to the study of query pro-
tocols for learning game-theoretic equilibria. In this seing, as in ours, algorithms for computing
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equilibria via utility and best response queries are a natural starting point. For utility queries, there
has been much work in proving exponential lower bounds for randomized computation of exact, ap-
proximate and well-supported Nash equilibria [Babichenko and Rubinstein, 2017, Babichenko, 2016,
Chen et al., 2015, Goldberg and Roth, 2016, Hart and Mansour, 2010, Hart and Nisan, 2016], as well as
providing query-efficient protocols for approximate Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games,
congestion games [Fearnley et al., 2015], anonymous games [Goldberg and Turchea, 2017], and large
games [Goldberg et al., 2019]. Best response queries are forcibly weaker than utility queries, but they
arise naturally in practice, and are also expressive enough to implement fictitious play, a dynamic
first proposed in Brown [1949], and proven to converge in [Robinson, 1951] for two-player zero-
sum games to an approximate Nash equilibrium. In terms of equilibrium computation, the authors in
[Goldberg and Marmolejo-Cossı´o, 2018] also provide query-efficient algorithms for computing approx-
imate Nash equilibria for bimatrix games via best response queries provided one agent has a constant
number of strategies.
Finally, learning via incentive queries in games is directly related to the theory of preference elic-
itation, where the goal is to mine information about the private parameters of the agents by inter-
acting with them [Blum et al., 2004, Lahaie and Parkes, 2004, Zinkevich et al., 2003, Goldberg et al.,
2020]. is has many applications, most notably combinatorial auctions, where access to the valu-
ation functions of the agents is achieved via value or demand queries [Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007,
Conen and Sandholm, 2001, Nisan and Segal, 2006].
2 Preliminaries
A Stackelberg game (SG) is a sequential game between a leader and a follower1. e leader commits
to a strategy, and the follower then acts upon observing this commitment. We consider finite SGs, in
which the leader and the follower havem and n pure strategies at their disposal, respectively, and their
utilities for all possible outcomes are given by the matrices uL, uF ∈ Rm×n. e entries uL(i, j) and
uF (i, j) denote the utilities of the leader and the follower, under pure strategy profile (i, j) ∈ [m]× [n].
We use G = (uL, uF ) to denote the SG with payoff matrices uL and uF ; we omitm and n as they are
clear from context.
Like one-shot games, the agents are allowed to employ mixed strategies whereby they randomize
over actions in their strategy set. A mixed strategy of the leader is a probability distribution over
[m], denoted by x ∈ ∆m−1 = {x ≥ 0 : ∑i∈[m] xi = 1}. By slightly abusing notation, we let
uL(x, j) =
∑
i∈[m] xi · uL(i, j) be the expected utility of the leader when she plays the mixed strategy
x and the follower plays a pure strategy j. Similarly, we define uF (x, j) =
∑
i∈[m] xi · uF (i, j) for
the follower. For a given mixed strategy x ∈ ∆m−1 of the leader, we say that j ∈ [n] is a follower
best response if uF (x, j) = maxℓ∈[n] u
F (x, ℓ); we denote the set of all follower best responses to x by
BR(x) ⊆ [n] and refer to the function BR as the best response correspondence of the follower.
A strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept in SGs, and captures the
situation where the leader commits to a mixed strategy that maximizes her expected utility, while
taking into account the follower’s best response to her commitment. It is assumed that the follower
breaks ties in favor of the leader when he has multiple best responses. 2
Definition 2.1 (SSE). A strategy profile (x, j) is an SSE of the SG G = (uL, uF ) if
(x, j) ∈ argmaxy∈∆m−1, ℓ∈BR(y)uL(y, ℓ).
1Following the standard convention, we will refer to the leader as a female and to the follower as a male.
2is standard assumption is justified by the fact that such tie-breaking behavior can oen be enforced by an infinitesimal
perturbation in the leader’s strategy [Stengel and Zamir, 2004].
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Learning SSEs and Deceptive Follower Behavior. We consider the scenario where the leader has
full knowledge of her utility matrix uL, and aims to compute an SSE by interacting with the follower
and gleaning information about uF . For example, the leader could observe follower best responses in
play (akin to having query access to BR), or observe follower payoffs at pure strategy profiles during
play (akin to having query access to uF as a function). Hence, this can be cast as the problem of
learning an SSE with a specified notion of query access to information about the follower’s incentives.
Consider an SG G = (uL, uF ). If the follower controls the flow of information to the leader in
this paradigm, he may consider perpetually interacting with the leader as if he had a different payoff
matrix u˜F , which can make the leader believe that both agents are playing the game G˜ = (uL, u˜F ).
is deceiving power provides the follower with an incentive to act according to G˜ for a judicious
choice of u˜F , because the SSEs in G˜ may provide larger utility (according to uF ) than the SSEs in G.
More concretely, the example below shows that the follower can gain an arbitrary benefit by deceiving
the leader to play a different game.
Example 2.2 (Beneficial deception). Let α ∈ [0, 1] and consider the following matrices:
R =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, Cα =
(
0 α
1 α
)
Now, suppose that uL = R and uF = Cα, and let x ∈ [0, 1] represent the probability mass that
the leader (row player) places on the first row (her first strategy); thus, 1 − x is the probability with
which she plays her second strategy. Given this mixed strategy of the leader, the utilities that the
follower expects to derive from her two strategies (columns) are uF (x, 1) = 1 − x and uF (x, 2) = α.
Consequently, the first strategy is a best response of the follower when x ∈ [0, 1− α], and the second
one is a best response when x ∈ (1 − α, 1] (when x = 1 − α, the tie is broken in favor of the leader).
With this information, it is clear that the SSE of the game occurs when the leader chooses x = 1− α
and the follower plays his first strategy. As a result, the follower’s utility is uF (1− α, 1) = α.
However, for any α < 1, the follower has an incentive to deceive the leader into playing the game
G˜ = (R,C1), which will improve his utility in the resulting SSE to 1. is will be an improvement by
a multiplicative factor of 1/α, which can be arbitrarily large when α is arbitrarily close to 0.
Inducible Strategy Profiles. e ultimate goal of the follower is to identify the SSE that maximizes
his true utility, from the set of SSEs that he can deceive the leader into learning. We will refer to such
SSEs as inducible strategy profiles. At a high level, the follower’s problem can now be expressed as the
following optimization problem:
max
x,j
uF (x, j), (1)
subject to (x, j) is inducible
is maximum utility for the follower is called the optimal inducible utility. If the maximum value is
never achieved, then for every ε > 0, we would like to be able to find an inducible SSE that achieves a
value ε-close to the supremum value.
As discussed previously, the leader can learn an SSE by gleaning information about the incentives
of the follower by querying the best responses of the follower to particular leader strategies, or more
refined information about the follower’s payoff matrix. Depending on the type of information queried,
we can define various levels of inducible strategy profiles.
In more detail, suppose the leader can only query the best responses of the follower, who behaves
according to some best response correspondence B˜R : ∆m−1 → 2[n] \ {∅}. is interaction between
the leader and the follower leads to a game G˜ = (uL, B˜R) where only information about B˜R is known
(instead of a payoff matrix implying B˜R). e definition of B˜R enforces a best response answer to
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any possible query. Consequently, the leader learns an SSE (x, j) ∈ argmax
y∈∆m−1, ℓ∈B˜R(y)
uL(y, ℓ),
which yields the following notion of BR-inducible strategy profiles.
Definition 2.3 (BR-inducibility). A strategy profile (x, j) is BR-inducible with respect to uL if there
exists a best response correspondence B˜R : ∆m−1 → 2[n] \ {∅} such that (x, j) is an SSE of the game
G˜ = (uL, B˜R), in which case we say that (x, j) is induced by B˜R.
Next, consider the case where the leader can query information about the payoffs of the follower,
who can now behave according to a fake payoff matrix u˜F . We refer to the SSEs of the resulting game
G˜ = (uL, u˜F ) as payoff-inducible strategy profiles.
Definition 2.4 (Payoff-inducibility). A strategy profile (x, j) is said to be payoff-inducible with respect
to uL if there exists u˜F ∈ Rm×n such that (x, j) is an SSE in the game G˜ = (uL, u˜F ), in which case
we say that (x, j) is induced by u˜F .
Clearly, payoff-inducibility is stricter than BR-inducibility: for every choice of u˜F , the correspond-
ing best response correspondence B˜R(y) = argmaxℓ∈[n] u˜
F (y, ℓ) induces the same SSEs as u˜F does.
Note that the above definitions only require an inducible strategy profile to be a verifiable SSE,
with respect to information about the follower’s incentive (either B˜R or u˜F ). However, it may happen
that the resulting game G˜ has multiple SSEs, which gives rise to an equilibrium selection issue. Indeed,
in practice, it is not realistic to assume that the follower has any control over which SSE is chosen
by the leader (who moves the first in the game). To address this, and thus completely resolve the
optimal deception problem for the follower, we introduce an even stricter notion of inducibility on top
of payoff-inducibility, which requires G˜ to have a unique SSE.
Definition 2.5 (Strong inducibility). A strategy profile (x, j) is said to be strongly inducible with
respect to uL, if there exists a matrix u˜F ∈ Rm×n such that (x, j) is the unique SSE of the game
G˜ = (uL, u˜F ), in which case we say that (x, j) is strongly induced by u˜F .
In the next sections, we will investigate solutions to (1) under the inducibility notions above, from
the weakest to the strongest. Our general approach is to decompose (1) into n sub-problems by enu-
merating all possible follower responses j ∈ [n]. For each strategy j, we solve the corresponding
optimization problem, and pick the one that yields the maximum utility for the follower. Due to space
constraints, some proofs are omied and can be found in the supplementary material.
3 Best Response Inducibility
Let us start our analysis by considering the case in which the leader queries the best responses of the
follower. e aim of the follower is to deceive the leader towards a strategy profile that is BR-inducible;
see Definition 2.3. Indeed, if the follower is allowed to use an arbitrary B˜R to induce a strategy profile
(x, j), he can simply define B˜R as follows:
B˜R(y) =
{
{j} if y = x
argminℓ∈[n] u
L(y, ℓ) if y 6= x.
Namely, the follower threatens to choose the worst possible response against any leader strategy y 6=
x, so as to minimize the leader’s incentive to commit to these strategies. is B˜R will successfully
convince the leader that (x, j) is an SSE of G˜, hence inducing (x, j), if the threat is powerful enough,
that is, if uL(x, j) ≥ minℓ∈[n] uL(y, ℓ) for all y ∈ ∆m−1. Equivalently, this means that
uL(x, j) ≥M := max
y∈∆m−1
min
ℓ∈[n]
uL(y, ℓ), (2)
5
whereM is exactly the leader’s maximin utility. Indeed, (2) is necessary for (x, j) to be BR-inducible:
if on the contrary uL(x, j) < M , then by commiing to y∗ ∈ argmaxy∈∆m−1 minℓ∈[n] uL(y, ℓ), the
leader can obtain (at least) her maximin utility, which will be strictly larger than uL(x, j).
us, condition (2) gives a simple criterion for BR-inducibility. e problem is that such B˜R may
be far from being one that arises from a choice of u˜F . To alleviate this limitation, we impose a stricter
condition on B˜R.
Polytopal BR Correspondence. In a similar vein to Goldberg and Marmolejo-Cossı´o [2018], we
require that, for every ℓ ∈ [n], the set of leader strategies to which ℓ is a best response B˜R−1(ℓ) =
{y ∈ ∆m−1 : ℓ ∈ B˜R(y)} is a closed convex polytope, and the union of all these sets forms a partition
of∆m−1 (for example, see the polytope partition of∆2 in Figure 1). Any best response correspondence
B˜R satisfying this assumption is called polytopal.
Definition 3.1 (Polytopal best response correspondence [Goldberg and Marmolejo-Cossı´o, 2018]). A
best response correspondence B˜R : ∆m−1 → 2[n] \ {∅} is polytopal if it also satisfies the following:
• B˜R
−1
(ℓ) is a closed convex polytope for each ℓ ∈ [n], and
• For each k 6= ℓ, either relint(B˜R−1(k)) ∩ relint(B˜R−1(ℓ)) = ∅ or B˜R−1(k) = B˜R−1(ℓ), where
relint(H) denotes the relative interior of a set H .
Being polytopal is necessary for B˜R to arise from some payoffmatrix. Indeed, the true best response
correspondence BR that arises from uF is polytopal: clearly, each BR−1(ℓ) is a closed convex polytope
defined by the hyperplanes uF (y, ℓ) ≥ uF (y, k) for all k ∈ [n] and the borders of ∆m−1; in addition,
∪nℓ=1BR−1(ℓ) = ∆m−1, and for any ℓ 6= k, the polytopes BR−1(ℓ) and BR−1(k) only intersect at their
borders unless uF (·, ℓ) = uF (·, k). us, if the follower aempts to deceive the leader via a fake B˜R,
the leader might spot the deception in case B˜R is not polytopal.
It turns out that the following correspondence, which we denote as B˜RP, is polytopal and, as we
will shortly show, it is in fact as powerful as any best response correspondence.
B˜RP(y) =

{j} if y ∈ ∆m−1 \ Uj(x)
{j} ∪ argminℓ∈[n]\{j} uL(y, ℓ) if y ∈ Uj(x) \ Uj(x)
argminℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(y, ℓ) if y ∈ Uj(x)
where Uj(x) is the closure of Uj(x) =
{
y ∈ ∆m−1 : uL(y, j) > uL(x, j)}.3 Intuitively, it is safe for
the follower to respond by playing j against any leader strategy y if uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x, j), in which
case the leader does not have a strong incentive to commit to y instead of x. In response to the other
strategies, however, the follower needs to play a different strategy in order to minimize the leader’s
incentive to commit to such a y. erefore, this approach will successfully induce (x, j) if and only if
the following holds:
uL(x, j) ≥ max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ), (3)
where we use the convention that max∅ = −∞. It is easy to see that B˜RP is indeed polytopal:
B˜R
−1
P (j) = ∆
m−1 \Uj(x) is a closed convex polytope, and the same holds for the sets B˜R−1P (ℓ) defined
by the hyperplanes uL(y, ℓ) ≤ uL(y, k), k ∈ [n] \ {j} and the borders of Uj(x), which further form
a partition of Uj(x).
3Note that the use of Uj(x), instead of the set
{
y ∈ ∆m−1 : uL(y, j) ≥ uL(x, j)
}
, is important: when uL(y, j) =
uL(x, j) for all y ∈ ∆m−1, these two sets define different behaviors.
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In fact, (2) is equivalent to (3), meaning that the extra condition imposed on B˜RP does not compro-
mise its power: if (x, j) can be induced by an arbitrary B˜R then it can also be induced by B˜RP. We state
this result in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. uL(x, j) ≥M if and only if uL(x, j) ≥ max
y∈Uj(x)
minℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(y, ℓ).
Proof. Recall that we want to show that uL(x, j) ≥M if and only if
uL(x, j) ≥ max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ) (4)
whereM is the maximin utility of the leader.
We show that (4) does not hold if and only if uL(x, j) < M . Suppose that (4) does not hold. en
uL(x, j) < max
y∈Uj(x)
minℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(y, ℓ) by definition, which implies that Uj(x) 6= ∅. By the
continuity of minℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(·, ℓ), there exists y∗ ∈ Uj(x) such that
uL(x, j) < min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y∗, ℓ).
By the definition of Uj(x), we also have u
L(x, j) < uL(y∗, j). us,
uL(x, j) < min
ℓ∈[n]
uL(y∗, ℓ) ≤ max
y∈∆m−1
min
ℓ∈[n]
uL(y, ℓ) = M.
Conversely, suppose that uL(x, j) < M . Let y∗ ∈ argmaxy∈∆m−1 minℓ∈[n] uL(y, ℓ). us, M =
minℓ∈[n] u
L(y∗, ℓ), and we have
uL(x, j) < M = min
ℓ∈[n]
uL(y∗, ℓ) ≤ uL(y∗, j)
which implies that y∗ ∈ Uj(x). It follows thatM = maxy∈Uj(x)minℓ∈[n] uL(y, ℓ) and thus
uL(x, j) < max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]
uL(y, ℓ) ≤ max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ),
so (4) does not hold.
Using Lemma 3.2, we can efficiently compute the best strategy profile that can be induced by B˜RP,
simply by solving the following Linear Program (LP) for each j ∈ [n]:
max
x∈∆m−1
uF (x, j) (5)
subject to uL(x, j) ≥M
At this point, it might be tempting to think that with the polytopal constraint imposed, we would
also be able to construct an explicit payoff matrix u˜F to implement B˜RP. Unfortunately, this is not true
as Example 3.3 illustrates. Surprisingly though, in the next section we will show that, even though
we cannot construct a payoff matrix that implements B˜RP directly, every strategy profile (x, j) that
is B˜RP-inducible, is in fact payoff-inducible. We also present an efficient algorithm for computing a
payoff matrix u˜F to induce such (x, j).
Example 3.3. Consider a 3 × 3 game with the leader payoff matrix given in Figure 1. Let B˜RP be a
polytopal BR correspondence defined by the regions R1, R2, and R3 in Figure 1, such that ℓ ∈ B˜RP
if and only if y ∈ Rℓ. is best response behavior cannot be realized by any payoff matrix. To see
this, suppose B˜RP is realized by some u˜
F ∈ R3×3. Let x = (12 , 12 , 0), w = (12 , 0, 12), and z = (12 , 14 , 14).
We have B˜RP(z) = {1, 2, 3} and B˜RP(w) = {1, 3}. is means that uL(z, 1) = uL(z, 3) = uL(z, 2)
and uL(w, 1) = uL(w, 3) > uL(w, 2). Since x = 2z − w, by the linearity of the utility function,
uL(x, 1) = uL(x, 3) < uL(x, 2), which contradicts the fact that B˜RP(x) = {1, 2}.
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uL =
0 1 11 −1/2 1/2
1 1/2 −1/2
 R1
R2R3
x
z
w
1
0 1
y1
y2
Figure 1: No payoff matrix u˜F realizes the polytopal BR correspondence B˜RP, such that ℓ ∈ B˜RP if and only
if y ∈ Rℓ, where R1 = {y ∈ ∆2 : y1 ≥ y2 + y3}, R2 = {y ∈ ∆2 : y1 ≤ y2 + y3 and y2 ≥ y3}, and
R3 = {y ∈ ∆2 : y1 ≤ y2 + y3 and y2 ≤ y3}.
4 Payoff Inducibility
In this section, we will show that every profile strategy that can be induced by B˜RP is also payoff-
inducible, and a corresponding payoff matrix can be efficiently constructed. Recall that the maximin
utility of the leader is denote by M = maxy∈∆m−1 minℓ∈[n] u
L(y, ℓ). We will show the following
characterization as one of our key results, which enables us to use the LP in (5) to efficiently compute
a payoff matrix that achieves the optimal inducible utility.
eorem 4.1. A strategy profile (x, j) is payoff-inducible if and only if uL(x, j) ≥ M . Furthermore, a
matrix u˜F inducing (x, j) can be constructed in polynomial time.
One direction of the characterization is easy to show. Indeed, if (x, j) is payoff-inducible, then it
is also BR-inducible, and as seen in Section 3, it holds that uL(x, j) ≥M .
Now consider any profile (x, j) such that uL(x, j) ≥ M . Recall that Uj(x) = {y ∈ ∆m−1 :
uL(y, j) > uL(x, j)}. Without loss of generality, in what follows, we can also assume thatUj(x) 6= ∅:
if Uj(x) = ∅, then (x, j) will be an SSE if the follower always responds by playing j; this can easily
be achieved by claiming that j strictly dominates all other strategies, i.e., by leing u˜F (i, j) = 1 and
u˜F (i, ℓ) = 0 for all i ∈ [m] and ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j}.
We begin by analyzing the following payoff function that forms the basis of our approach. Let
Ŝ ⊆ [n] \ {j} and pick k ∈ argmin
ℓ∈Ŝ u
L(x, ℓ) arbitrarily. For all y ∈ ∆m−1, let
u˜F (y, ℓ) =

−uL(y, ℓ) if ℓ ∈ Ŝ
−uL(y, k) − 1 if ℓ ∈ [n] \ (Ŝ ∪ {j})
−uL(y, k) + α (uL(x, j) − uL(y, j)) if ℓ = j (6)
where α > 0 is a constant. In what follows, we will let B˜R denote the best response correspondence
corresponding to u˜F , i.e., B˜R(y) = argmaxℓ∈[n] u˜
F (y, ℓ). Note that we can compute the payoff matrix
corresponding to u˜F in polynomial time. en, the hope is that with appropriately chosen Ŝ and α,
the payoff matrix will induce (x, j). Indeed, u˜F has the following nice properties:
i. Strategy j is indeed a best response to x, since, by the choice of k we have
u˜F (x, j) = −uL(x, k) ≥ −min
ℓ∈Ŝ
uL(x, ℓ) = max
ℓ∈Ŝ
u˜F (x, ℓ).
ii. Any ℓ ∈ [n] \ (Ŝ ∪ {j}) cannot be a best response of the follower as it is strictly dominated by
k, i.e., u˜F (y, ℓ) < u˜F (y, k) for all y ∈ ∆m−1. us, B˜R(y) ⊆ Ŝ ∪ {j} for all y ∈ ∆m−1.
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iii. If j is a best response to some y ∈ ∆m−1, then uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x, j). Indeed, j ∈ B˜R(y) implies
that
u˜F (y, j) = max
ℓ∈[n]
u˜F (y, ℓ) ≥ u˜F (y, k).
Substituting u˜F (y, j) = −uL(y, k)+α (uL(x, j) − uL(y, j)) into this inequality and rearrang-
ing the terms immediately gives uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x, j).
iv. If any ℓ ∈ Ŝ is a best response to somey ∈ ∆m−1, then it holds that u˜F (y, ℓ) = max
ℓ′∈Ŝ u˜
F (y, ℓ′),
which implies that
uL(y, ℓ) = min
ℓ′∈Ŝ
uL(y, ℓ′). (7)
erefore, if the following also holds for the y in (iv),
min
ℓ′∈Ŝ
uL(y, ℓ′) ≤ uL(x, j),
then by (7) we will have uL(y, ℓ) ≤ uL(x, j) for every ℓ ∈ B˜R(y)∩ Ŝ. is, together with (ii) and (iii),
will imply that uL(x, j) ≥ uL(y, ℓ) for every ℓ ∈ B˜R(y). erefore, (x, j) will indeed form an SSE
given that j ∈ B˜R(x) by (i). We state this observation as the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. If min
ℓ′∈Ŝ
uL(y, ℓ′) ≤ uL(x, j) holds for all y ∈ ∆m−1 such that B˜R(y) ∩ Ŝ 6= ∅, then
the payoff matrix defined by (6) induces (x, j).
e proof of eorem 4.1 is then completed by showing the following result.
Proposition 4.3. If uL(x, j) ≥M and Uj(x) 6= ∅, then we can construct Ŝ ⊆ [n] \ {j} and α > 0 in
polynomial time, with which the condition of Lemma 4.2 holds for u˜F as defined in (6).
e proof relies on the following useful lemma.
Lemma 4.4 (Farkas’ Lemma [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2014]). Let A ∈ Rn1×n2 and b ∈ Rn1 . en
exactly one of the following statements is true:
1. there exists z ∈ Rn2 such that Az = b and z ≥ 0;
2. there exists z ∈ Rn1 such that ATz ≥ 0 and b · z < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider any strategy profile (x, j) with uL(x, j) ≥ M and Uj(x) 6= ∅. We
begin by taking care of a simple case, as an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.2.
Corollary 4.5. A matrix u˜F that induces (x, j) can be constructed in polynomial time if it holds that
uL(x, j) ≥M−j := max
y∈∆m−1
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ). (8)
Proof. Let Ŝ = [n] \ {j}. en, for every y ∈ ∆m−1, we immediately obtain that
uL(x, j) ≥ max
y∈∆m−1
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ) ≥ min
ℓ∈Ŝ
uL(y, ℓ)
By Lemma 4.2, the payoff matrix defined by (6) (with, say, α = 1) then induces (x, j), and can clearly
be computed in polynomial time.
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e more challenging case is when (8) does not hold (e.g., the case with the profile (x, 1) in Exam-
ple 3.3). In what follows, we prove Proposition 4.3 by showing that there is still a choice of Ŝ and α
that leads to the condition in Lemma 4.2, even when (8) does not hold. us, from now on, we assume
that
uL(x, j) < M−j . (9)
We define the following useful components. By Lemma 3.2 and the assumption that uL(x, j) ≥M ,
we know that
uL(x, j) ≥ V (10)
where
V = max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ).
Since Uj(x) 6= ∅, there exists y∗ ∈ Uj(x) such that
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y∗, ℓ) = V, (11)
which can be computed efficiently by solving an LP (i.e., maximize µ, subject to µ ≤ uL(y, ℓ) for all
ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j} and y ∈ Uj(x)). We then let
S = {ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j} |uL(y∗, ℓ) = V }.
Before we proceed, we prove two useful technical results.
Lemma 4.6. uL(y∗, j) = uL(x, j).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that uL(y∗, j) 6= uL(x, j). Since y∗ ∈ Uj(x), we have
that uL(y∗, j) ≥ uL(x, j), so it must be that uL(y∗, j) > uL(x, j).
e assumption (9) that uL(x, j) < M−j implies that there exists yˆ ∈ ∆m−1 such that
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(yˆ, ℓ) > uL(x, j) ≥ V,
wherewe also use (10). Now thatminℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(y∗, ℓ) = V by (11), by the concavity ofminℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(·, ℓ),
it follows thatminℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(z, ℓ) > V for all z on the segment [yˆ,y∗); z ∈ ∆m−1 as∆m−1 is con-
vex. Now that we have uL(y∗, j) > uL(x, j) under our assumption, when z is sufficiently close to y∗,
we can have uL(z, j) ≥ uL(x, j) and hence, z ∈ Uj(x). is leads to the contradiction that
V = max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ) ≥ min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(z, ℓ) > V.
Lemma 4.7. minℓ∈S u
L(y, ℓ) < V for all y ∈ Uj(x).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists yˆ ∈ Uj(x) such that
min
ℓ∈S
uL(yˆ, ℓ) ≥ V.
By assumption (9) that uL(x, j) < M−j , there exists z ∈ ∆m−1 such that minℓ∈[n]\{j} uL(z, ℓ) >
uL(x, j) ≥ V , which immediately yields the following given that S ⊆ [n] \ {j} by definition:
min
ℓ∈S
uL(z, ℓ) > V.
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By definition, uL(y∗, ℓ) = V for all ℓ ∈ S, which also implies that uL(y∗, ℓ) > V for all ℓ ∈ [n] \
({j} ∪ S) (otherwise, we would haveminℓ∈[n]\{j}uL(y∗,ℓ) < V ). us, we have
min
ℓ∈S
uL(y∗, ℓ) = V and min
ℓ∈[n]\({j}∪S)
uL(y∗, ℓ) > V.
Now consider a pointw on the segment (y∗, yˆ]. Since y∗ ∈ Uj(x) and yˆ ∈ Uj(x), i.e., uL(y∗, j) ≥
uL(x, j) and uL(yˆ, j) > uL(x, j), we have uL(w, j) > uL(x, j) and hence, w ∈ Uj(x). In addition,
by continuity, whenw is sufficiently close to y∗, we have
min
ℓ∈[n]\({j}∪S)
uL(w, ℓ) > V. (12)
By concavity of the function minℓ∈S u
L(·, ℓ), since minℓ∈S uL(y, ℓ) ≥ V for both y ∈ {y∗, yˆ}, we
have
min
ℓ∈S
uL(w, ℓ) ≥ V. (13)
Analogously, we can find a point w′ ∈ Uj(x) on the segment (w, z], such that (12) and (13) hold
for w′ while (13) is strict, in particular. us, we have
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(w′, ℓ) > V = max
y∈Uj(x)
min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ),
which is a contradiction asw′ ∈ Uj(x).
In what follows, we use the coordinates (y1, . . . , ym−1) for every point y ∈ ∆m−1, i.e., we have
∆m−1 =
{
(y1, . . . , ym−1) ∈ R≥0 :
m−1∑
i=1
yi ≤ 1
}
.
Accordingly, we can write the utility function as
uL(y, ℓ) = gℓ · y + uL(m, ℓ),
where gℓ ∈ Rm−1 and its i-th component is gℓ,i = uL(i, ℓ) − uL(m, ℓ); “·” denotes the inner product.
Hence, we have
uL(y, ℓ) = gℓ · (y − y∗) + uL(y∗, ℓ) =
{
gℓ · (y − y∗) + V if ℓ ∈ S
gj · (y − y∗) + uL(x, j) if ℓ = j
(14)
where uL(y∗, ℓ) = V for all ℓ ∈ S by the definition of S, and uL(y∗, j) = uL(x, j) by Lemma 4.6.
Note that since Uj(x) 6= ∅, it must be that gj 6= 0.
We also write the m boundary conditions that define ∆m−1 as ei · y ≥ βi. Namely, for each
i ∈ [m− 1], let ei ∈ Rm−1 be the i-th unit vector and βi = 0, while em = (−1, . . . ,−1) ∈ Rm−1 and
βm = −1. us, ∆m−1 = {y ∈ Rm−1 : ei · y ≥ βi for i ∈ [m]}. Let
B = {i ∈ [m] : ei · y∗ = βi}
be the set of boundary conditions that are tight for y∗. Note that for any y ∈ ∆m−1 we have
ei · (y − y∗) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ B. (15)
We can now prove the following result using Farkas’ Lemma (Lemma 4.4), which allows us to
express −gj as a non-negative linear combination of gℓ’s and ei’s.
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Lemma 4.8. −gj can be expressed as a non-negative linear combination of {gℓ : ℓ ∈ S}∪ {ei : i ∈ B},
i.e. −gj =
∑
ℓ∈S λℓgℓ +
∑
i∈B µiei, where λℓ ≥ 0 and µi ≥ 0.
Proof. We use Farkas’ Lemma (Lemma 4.4) and let n1 = m− 1 and n2 = |S|+ |B|. e columns ofA
are exactly the vectors {gℓ : ℓ ∈ S} ∪ {ei : i ∈ B}. We set b = −gj . Note that the first alternative of
Farkas’ Lemma immediately yields the statement we want to prove. us, we set out to prove that the
second alternative cannot hold.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists z ∈ Rm−1 such thatATz ≥ 0 and b ·z < 0,
i.e., gℓ · z ≥ 0 for all ℓ ∈ S, ei · z ≥ 0 for all i ∈ B, and gj · z > 0.
en, by picking δ > 0 sufficiently small, it holds for y = y∗ + δz that:
• By (14), we have the following for all ℓ ∈ S:
uL(y, ℓ) = gℓ · (y − y∗) + V = δgℓ · z+ V ≥ V.
In addition,
uL(y, j) = gj · (y − y∗) + uL(y∗, j) = δgj · z+ uL(x, j) > uL(x, j).
• y ∈ ∆m−1: For i ∈ B, we immediately obtain that ei · y = ei · (y∗ + δz) ≥ ei · y∗ = βi, which
means that these boundary conditions are satisfied. For i ∈ [m] \B, we know that ei · y∗ > βi
and thus by picking δ > 0 small enough, we can ensure that ei · y = ei · y∗ + δ(ei · z) ≥ βi.
us, it follows thaty ∈ Uj(x) andminℓ∈S uL(y, ℓ) ≥ V . But this cannot hold according to Lemma 4.7.
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 4.3. We first express −gj as a non-negative linear
combination of the vectors {gℓ : ℓ ∈ S} ∪ {ei : i ∈ B}. By Lemma 4.8 we know that this is possible
and it is easy to see that we can find the coefficients in polynomial time (e.g. by solving an LP). We
thus obtain −gj =
∑
ℓ∈S λℓgℓ +
∑
i∈B µiei, where λℓ ≥ 0 for every ℓ ∈ S and µi ≥ 0 for every
i ∈ B. Let Ŝ = {ℓ ∈ S : λℓ > 0}. We will argue that Ŝ 6= ∅.
Observe that since now −gj =
∑
ℓ∈S λℓgℓ +
∑
i∈B µiei and, by (15), we have ei · (y − y∗) ≥ 0
for all y ∈ ∆m−1 and i ∈ B, it follows that, for all y ∈ ∆m−1, we have
−gj · (y − y∗) =
∑
ℓ∈S
λℓgℓ · (y − y∗) +
∑
i∈B
µiei · (y − y∗)
≥
∑
ℓ∈S
λℓgℓ · (y − y∗)
=
∑
ℓ∈Ŝ
λℓgℓ · (y − y∗), (16)
where the last transition is due to the fact that λℓ = 0 for all ℓ ∈ S \ Ŝ, as implied by the definition of
Ŝ.
Since Uj(x) 6= ∅, consider any y ∈ Uj(x). By definition, this means that uL(y, j) > uL(x, j),
which further implies that gj · (y−y∗) > 0 since uL(y, j) = gj · (y−y∗)+uL(x, j) by (14). By (16),
we then have ∑
ℓ∈Ŝ
λℓgℓ · (y − y∗) < 0.
Hence, Ŝ 6= ∅.
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It remains to show thatwith the above Ŝ and, in particular,α = 1/λk (recall that k ∈ argminℓ∈Ŝ uL(x, ℓ)),
the condition in Lemma 4.2 holds, i.e., we prove that min
ℓ∈Ŝ u
L(y, ℓ) ≤ uL(x, j) holds for all y ∈
∆m−1 such that B˜R(y) ∩ Ŝ 6= ∅.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists y ∈ ∆m−1 such that B˜R(y) ∩ Ŝ 6= ∅, but
uL(y, ℓ) > uL(x, j) for all ℓ ∈ Ŝ. By (10), we have uL(x, j) ≥ V , and thus uL(y, ℓ) > V for all ℓ ∈ Ŝ.
By (14), we have uL(y, ℓ) = gℓ · (y − y∗) + V ; thus, gℓ · (y − y∗) > 0 for all ℓ ∈ Ŝ.
Using (16) and the fact that k ∈ Ŝ by our choice, we then obtain
−gj · (y − y∗) ≥
∑
ℓ∈Ŝ
λℓgℓ · (y − y∗) ≥ λkgk · (y − y∗).
By (14), we have
uL(x, j) − uL(y, j) = −gj · (y − y∗).
Recall that it is defined that u˜F (y, j) = −uL(y, k)+α (uL(x, j) − uL(y, j)) as in (6). Using the above
two equations and (14), we then obtain the following:
u˜F (y, j) = −uL(y, k) + α (uL(x, j) − uL(y, j))
= −gk · (y − y∗)− V − αgj · (y − y∗)
≥ −V + (αλk − 1)gk · (y − y∗)
= −V.
However, by (6) we also have u˜F (y, ℓ) = −uL(y, ℓ) if ℓ ∈ Ŝ, which implies that for all ℓ ∈ Ŝ it holds
that
u˜F (y, j) ≥ −V > −uL(y, ℓ) = u˜F (y, ℓ).
Hence, B˜R(y) ∩ Ŝ = ∅, which contradicts our assumption.
5 Robustness with Respect to Equilibrium Selection
As discussed in Section 2, a weakness of BR- and payoff-inducible strategy profiles is that the resulting
games may have multiple SSEs, in which case the follower depends on the leader to choose the SSE
that maximizes his utility. To avoid this, in this section, we turn our aention to strong inducibility
(see Definition 2.5) and aempt to find a payoff matrix u˜F such that G˜ has a unique SSE.
We begin with an example showcasing that, in general, the best strongly inducible profile can be
much worse than the best payoff-inducible profile.
Example 5.1. Consider a 3×2 gameG = (uL, uF )with the payoffmatrices given in Figure 2. Note that
the follower obtains positive utility only by playing his strategy 1. Now, observe that the SSE (x∗, 1),
x∗ = (0, 0, 1) ∈ ∆2, is payoff-inducible and yields a utility of 1 for the follower: it can be induced by
any payoff matrix in which strategy 1 of the follower strictly dominates all other strategies. However,
such a payoff matrix will also induce other SSEs, e.g., (y∗, 1) with y∗ = (1, 0, 0) ∈ ∆2. Indeed, it holds
that no profile of the form (y, 1) can be strongly induced, and thus the optimal utility the follower can
obtain at a strongly inducible profile is 0. To see this, first note that, as seen above, if the follower
claims that strategy 1 is his unique best response for all points in ∆2, then the SSE is not unique. On
the other hand, if strategy 2 is a best response at some point z ∈ ∆2, then (y, 1) will not be an SSE,
since for the leader uL(y, 1) < uL(z, 2) for any y, z ∈ ∆2.
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uL =
1/4 10 1/3
1/4 2/3
 uF =
1/2 01/2 0
1 0

R1
x∗ y
∗
1
0 1
y2
y1
Figure 2: A game where the optimal inducible utility is 1, but the optimal strongly inducible utility is 0.
uL =
 1 00 1
1/2 1/4
 uF =
1/4 1/31/4 1/2
1 1/6
 R1
R2
x∗
y∗w
∗
1
0 1
y2
y1
Figure 3: A non-max-degenerate game forwhich the optimal inducible utility cannot be achieved by any strongly
inducible profile.
e problem in Example 5.1 stems from the following observation: if the follower reports a payoff
matrix such that strategy 1 is the unique best response for all points in the domain, then there are
multiple SSEs. is can be thought of as a “degenerate” case, since it would occur with probability 0,
if the payoffs of the leader were drawn uniformly at random in [0, 1]. We formalize this as follows.
Definition 5.2. A leader payoff matrix uL is said to be max-degenerate, if there exists j ∈ [n] such
that | argmaxi∈[m] uL(i, j)| > 1.
We next provide an example showing that even when uL is not max-degenerate, we cannot hope
to exactly achieve the optimal inducible utility via a strongly inducible profile.
Example 5.3. Consider a 3× 2 game with the leader and follower payoff matrices given in Figure 3.
It is easy to check that uL is not max-degenerate. Now, observe that the maximin utility of the leader
is M = 1/2 and is achieved at the point y∗ = (12 ,
1
2 , 0) ∈ ∆2. Let x∗ = (0, 0, 1) ∈ ∆2. Since
uL(x∗, 1) = 1/2 ≥M , it follows that (x∗, 1) is payoff-inducible by eorem 4.1. Indeed, the partition
(R1, R2) of ∆
2 in Figure 3 shows how (x∗, 1) can be induced. Note that uF (x∗, 1) = 1, while any
profile different from (x∗, 1) yields utility strictly less than 1 for the follower. We will now show
that (x∗, 1) cannot be strongly induced, which implies that any strongly inducible profile gives utility
strictly less than 1 to the follower. Indeed, suppose that (x∗, 1) is induced by some u˜F . If by u˜F strategy
1 is a best response to y∗, then (x∗, 1) cannot be the unique SSE, since uL(x∗, 1) = uL(y∗, 1). On
the other hand, if strategy 2 is the only best response to y∗, then there exists some sufficiently small
δ > 0 such that strategy 2 is also a best response to w∗ = (12 − δ, 12 + δ, 0) (see Figure 3). However,
this means that (x∗, 1) cannot be an SSE, since uL(x∗, 1) = 1/2 and uL(w∗, 2) = 1/2 + δ.
As a result, unlike in the previous section, here we cannot hope to solve the problem exactly.
However, the next theorem shows that we can approximate the optimal utility with arbitrarily good
precision.
eorem 5.4. If uL is not max-degenerate, then for any ε > 0, the follower can strongly induce a
profile (x, j) that yields the optimal inducible utility up to an additive loss of at most ε. Furthermore, a
matrix u˜F strongly inducing (x, j) can be constructed in time polynomial in log(1/ε) (and the size of the
representation of the game).
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Proof. Let (x∗, j) be a payoff-inducible profile that yields the optimal inducible payoff for the follower.
By eorem 4.1, such a profile can be computed in polynomial time.
We begin by solving the following LP.
max
δ,x
δ
s.t. x ∈ ∆m−1
uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j) − ε
uL(x, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ
(17)
Note that this LP can be solved in time polynomial in log(1/ε). Furthermore, note that the polytope
of feasible points is not empty since δ = 0 and x = x∗ satisfy all the constraints. Finally, the LP is not
unbounded since δ can be at most maxi∈[m] u
L(i, j) − uL(x∗, j).
In the rest of this proof let δ and x denote an optimal solution to this LP. Note that we can in
particular assume thatx is a vertex of the convex polytopePδ = {y ∈ ∆m−1 : uL(y, j) = uL(x∗, j)+
δ}. Indeed, given a solution δ,x to LP (17), if x is not a vertex of Pδ , then we consider the LP
max
y
uF (y, j)
s.t. y ∈ ∆m−1
uL(y, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ
It is known that a solution of an LP that is also a vertex of the feasible polytope can be computed in
polynomial time [Gro¨tschel et al., 1981]. Note that in this case the feasible polytope is exactly Pδ . Let
y be an optimal solution that is a vertex of Pδ . We know that x ∈ Pδ and uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j) − ε,
which implies that uF (y, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j) − ε. But this means that δ,y is also an optimal solution to
the original LP (17). us, by leing x := y, we indeed have that x is a vertex of the convex polytope
Pδ .
Let us first handle the casewhere δ = 0 by showing that (x∗, j) itself can be strongly induced. Since
δ = 0, it follows that Uj(x
∗) = ∅. Indeed, if there exists yˆ ∈ ∆m−1 with uL(yˆ, j) > uL(x∗, j), then
there exists y on the segment (x∗, yˆ] such that uF (y, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j)−ε (when y is sufficiently close to
x∗) and uL(y, j) > uL(x∗, j), a contradiction to the optimality of δ = 0. Now, given thatUj(x
∗) = ∅,
we have that uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x∗, j) for all y ∈ ∆m−1. But since uL is not max-degenerate (in the sense
of Definition 5.2), it follows that in fact uL(y, j) < uL(x∗, j) for all y ∈ ∆m−1 \ {x∗}. us, if the
follower always best responds with strategy j, then (x∗, j) will be the unique SSE. As seen before, it
is easy to implement this behavior by reporting u˜F (i, j) = 1 and u˜F (i, ℓ) = 0 for all i ∈ [m] and
ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j}.
In the rest of this proof, we consider the case δ > 0 and show that (x, j) can be strongly induced.
Since uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j) − ε, this means that at (x, j) the follower achieves the optimal inducible
utility up to an additive error of ε. Using the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 4.3, we let
B = {i ∈ [m] : ei · x = βi}
denote the set of boundary conditions of∆m−1 that are tight for x. Note that since x is a vertex of the
polytope Pδ , it follows that B 6= ∅. We let h =
∑
i∈B ei. As in the proof of Proposition 4.3, we have
that for all y ∈ ∆m−1 it holds that
h · (y − x) =
∑
i∈B
ei · (y − x) ≥ 0. (18)
Furthermore, since x is a vertex of Pδ , it follows that for all y ∈ Pδ \ {x} there exists i ∈ B such that
ei · (y − x) > 0, and thus
h · (y − x) > 0. (19)
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Indeed, if ei · (y− x) = 0 for all i ∈ B for some y ∈ Pδ \ {x}, this would contradict the fact that x is
a vertex of Pδ (i.e. the unique point in Pδ for which the boundary conditions in B are tight).
We are now ready to construct the payoff matrix reported by the follower. Pick an arbitrary k ∈
argminℓ∈[n]\{j} u
L(x, ℓ). For all y ∈ ∆m−1 let
u˜F (y, ℓ) =
{
−uL(y, ℓ) if ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j}
−uL(y, k) + α (uL(x, j) − uL(y, j)) − h · (y − x) if ℓ = j (20)
where α =
(
2maxi∈[m]maxℓ∈[n]
∣∣uL(i, ℓ)∣∣+m) /δ > 0. Note that we can compute the payoff matrix
corresponding to this utility function in polynomial time. In the remainder of this proof, we show that
(x, j) is the unique SSE of the game (uL, u˜F ).
Clearly, j is a best response at x, since
u˜F (x, j) = −uL(x, k) = − min
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
uL(x, ℓ) = max
ℓ∈[n]\{j}
u˜F (x, ℓ),
by the choice of k.
Next, let us show that if j is a best response at some y ∈ ∆m−1 \ {x}, then uL(y, j) < uL(x, j).
Indeed, if j is a best response at y, then in particular u˜F (y, j) ≥ u˜F (y, k), which implies that
α
(
uL(x, j) − uL(y, j)) ≥ h · (y − x). (21)
Since h · (y − x) ≥ 0 by (18), and α > 0, it follows that uL(x, j) ≥ uL(y, j). It remains to show
that uL(x, j) 6= uL(y, j). But if uL(x, j) = uL(y, j), then y ∈ Pδ \ {x} and so by (19) we have
h · (y − x) > 0, which contradicts (21).
Finally, it remains to show that if ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j} is a best response at some y ∈ ∆m−1, then it
must be that uL(y, ℓ) < uL(x, j): Indeed, if ℓ ∈ [n] \ {j} is a best response at y, then in particular
u˜F (y, j) ≤ u˜F (y, ℓ), which by (20) means that
α
(
uL(x, j) − uL(y, j)) ≤ −uL(y, ℓ) + uL(y, k) + h · (y − x)
≤ −uL(y, ℓ) + uL(y, k) + ‖h‖2‖y − x‖2
≤ 2max
i∈[m]
max
ℓ′∈[n]
|uL(i, ℓ′)|+√m− 1√m− 1
≤ αδ
by the choice of α. us, we obtain that uL(x, j) − uL(y, j) ≤ δ, which implies that uL(y, j) ≥
uL(x∗, j), i.e. y ∈ Uj(x∗) (since Uj(x∗) 6= ∅). Since (x∗, j) is payoff-inducible, which means that
uL(x∗, j) ≥M , we can use Lemma 3.2 to obtain
uL(x, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ > uL(x∗, j) ≥ min
ℓ′∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, ℓ′) = uL(y, ℓ)
where the last equality comes from the fact that ℓ is a best response at y, i.e., in particular u˜F (y, ℓ) =
maxℓ′∈[n]\{j} u˜
F (y, ℓ′).
6 Directions for Future Work
An interesting first question that emerges from our results, is how to design countermeasures to miti-
gate the potential loss of a learning leader, caused by possible deceptive behavior of the follower. is
was considered in [Gan et al., 2019b], where as a solution it was proposed that the leader could commit
to a policy, which is a strategy conditioned on the report of the follower, instead of a strategy. However,
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in contrast to [Gan et al., 2019b], where the follower’s report is limited to a finite set of payoff matri-
ces, computing the optimal policy in our model seems to be a very challenging problem. In addition,
it would be nice to explore whether the optimal follower payoff matrix (or a good approximation of
it) can still be computed efficiently, when additional constraints on how much he can deviate from his
true payoffmatrix are imposed. Finally, another interesting direction would be to quantify and provide
tight bounds on the leader’s utility loss, caused by the deceptive behavior of the follower.
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